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Abstract—With a move to ‘smarter’ distribution networks
through an increase in distribution automation and active net-
work management, the volume of monitoring data available to
engineers also increases. It can be onerous to interpret such
data to produce meaningful information about the health and
performance of automation and control equipment. Moreover,
indicators of incipient failure may have to be tracked over several
hours or days.
This paper discusses some of the data analysis challenges
inherent in assessing the health and performance of distribution
automation based on available monitoring data. A rule-based
expert system approach is proposed to provide decision support
for engineers regarding the condition of these components. Im-
plementation of such a system using a complex event processing
system shell, to remove the manual task of tracking alarms over
a number of days, is discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
WHILST the scope of definition for the ‘smart grid’ is wide
and differs across territories, certain visions of how our energy
infrastructure is predicted to evolve during the coming decades
are shared. It is envisaged in [1] and [2] that information
and communications technologies will play a key role in the
delivery of future networks.
For the operation of future distribution networks, these
visions translate into a number of changes from common
practice:
• An increasingly observable network—the proliferation of
communications and monitoring equipment on distribu-
tion networks will result in greater observability at lower
voltage levels.
• Bi-directional power flows, introduced through the con-
nection of distributed energy resources—for networks
originally designed for uni-directional power flows, this
can lead to congestion and problems regulating voltage.
• Increased use or even reliance on distribution automation
and active network management, as a means of providing
reliable and cost effective supply of electricity.
• Controllable load through various demand-side manage-
ment measures.
However, these changes to current practice are likely to
result in a number of challenges for the utility personnel tasked
with operating distribution networks. One such challenge is
the increased volumes of data that such a highly monitored,
active distribution system, with widespread use of automation,
is likely to produce.
Intelligent systems researchers within the power systems
community have long understood the problems associated with
deriving meaningful information from power systems data,
especially under extreme conditions, such as during storms
or other network events. Over two decades of research have
produced numerous expert systems [3], [4], [5], [6], [7],
and model-based reasoning systems [8], [9], [10], for alarm
processing for both transmission and distribution systems.
However, the move to more observable distribution networks,
which are active rather than passive, leads to a new set
of challenges in understanding system behavior, health and
performance of distribution automation and active network
management schemes on a day-to-day basis.
Arguably, active network management is still in its infancy.
Only a handful of schemes have seen deployment around the
world [11], and utilities are still learning what the impact on
the routine operation of the networks will be and what, from
an operational perspective, the widespread roll-out of such
schemes is likely to entail.
On the other hand, one area where much more experience
has been gained is that of distribution automation. Regulatory
pressure in the form of incentives relating to reliability of
supply, e.g. customer minutes lost (CML) and customer inter-
ruption (CI) in the UK; and the customer average interruption
duration index (CAIDI) in the USA, have resulted in utilities
investing in distribution automation in a bid to increase their
revenue.
Distribution automation to improve customer service, and
in doing so meet or exceed regulatory targets, can take
various forms: remote terminal unit (RTU) based schemes
[12]; automatic teleswitching schemes [12]; and novel peer-
to-peer communicating schemes, such as S&C Electric’s In-
telliTeam2 [13]. However, regardless of the type of distribution
automation used, understanding both the performance and
health of such schemes is an operational requirement. In order
to make a positive impact (and not a negative impact) on
reliability of supply, distribution automation schemes must
operate when needed. Identifying incipient failures, scheme
performance issues or problems with equipment health before
they result in failure of the scheme to operate when needed, is
an important task: it ensures that schemes perform in such
a way that justifies the investment in the first place. This
includes the health and performance of the communication
systems on which they may rely. Often, such information is
implicit in the power systems data that engineers use to make
such assessments. Moreover, the volumes of data produced
by a large number of schemes can make manual analysis of
the data impractical. Symptoms of incipient failure may be
seen over several hours, days or even weeks. Tracking such
symptoms can be problematic.
This paper discusses distribution automation in general and
the requirement for automatic analysis of data relating to the
health and performance of distribution automation schemes.
A case study is included, which considers some of the data
analysis problems seen by a UK utility after the widespread
roll-out of a particular type of distribution automation scheme.
This paper outlines some of the decision support requirements
from the perspective of the engineers tasked with maintaining
and managing such schemes.
In terms of decision support technologies, the paper exam-
ines the use of complex event processing and rule-based expert
systems as a means of dealing with that data. Example rules
for identifying a number of scheme health and performance
issues, derived through knowledge elicitation, are presented.
How these rules are used within a prototype alarm processing
system, currently under development, is described. Future
extensions to that prototype are also discussed.
II. DISTRIBUTION AUTOMATION AND SMART GRID
The term ‘distribution automation’ connotes a wide set of
technologies and approaches to the remote operation of distri-
bution networks. Distribution automation can be thought of as
“a set of technologies that enable an electric utility to remotely
monitor, coordinate and operate distribution components in
real-time mode from remote locations” [12].
Northcote-Green and Wilson identify three classes of dis-
tribution automation [12]:
1) Local Automation—switch operation performed by pro-
tection or local logic-based decision-making operation;
2) SCADA (telecontrol)—manually initiated switch opera-
tion by remote control with remote monitoring of status,
indications, alarms and measurements; and
3) Centralized Automation—automatic switch operation by
remote control from central decision-making for fault
isolation, network reconfiguration and service restora-
tion.
Examples of all three can be found in the operation of
distribution networks in the UK. A fairly high level of telecon-
trol is commonplace with certain companies, who have made
investments in telecontrol due to the CML savings they can
achieve on particular classes of circuit.
Restoration via telecontrol can be problematic. Depending
on prevailing network conditions, control engineers may not
be able to respond and restore customers within three minutes,
after which CML start to accrue. During storm conditions or
busy periods, it may not be possible for the control engineer
to manage large numbers of restorations within that timescale.
Human factors aside, restoration via telecontrol is beholden
to the availability and performance of communications and
telecontrol equipment.
Several utilities in the UK have experience with a central-
ized approach to automatic restoration. Automation scripts run
in the distribution network management system environment,
e.g. Korn shell scripts run within GE’s ENMAC, can be used
to automatically execute a sequence of control actions for
restoring customer supply after a fault. For example, a very
simple script may do the following after being triggered by
the operation of a breaker:
1) check that automation is enabled on a given feeder;
2) check the status of a remotely controllable sectionalizer
and normally open point;
3) open the sectionalizer and check for successful opera-
tion;
4) close the a normally open point and check for successful
operation.
Scripting in the Distribution Management System (DMS)
is not without its foibles. Scripts may not cover all possible
operating states and thus exit early when experiencing unusual
conditions. Time-outs due to communications delays can also
cause scripts to terminate before restoration is complete. For
example, a script may wait 20 seconds for confirmation of
the status change of a switch. Communications delays may
cause that confirmation to take over 20 seconds to arrive at the
control room; however, by then the script will have terminated
early. So, like restoration via telecontrol, centralized automa-
tion is also beholden to the availability and performance of
communications and telecontrol equipment.
Other utilities also use local automation schemes, sometimes
in addition to the centralized approach. These can range from
non-communicating automation schemes, such as the use of
automatic sectionlizing links including ‘smart fuses’ and auto-
reclosers [12], to a communicating RTU-based automation
scheme such as that described in section III. Recent years have
also seen the first trials of peer-to-peer network restoration
schemes, such as trials of S&C Electric’s IntelliTeam2 on the
Isle of Wight [13], although IntelliTeam2 has seen a large
number of other deployments around the world.
In relation to the ‘smart grid’, distribution automation can
play a role in achieving the oft-mooted ‘self-healing’ function-
ality. Financial incentives to improve reliability of supply can
drive distribution network operators to invest in distribution
automation to that end.
However, increasing levels of distribution automation lead to
a requirement for ways of analyzing the data related to scheme
health and performance. In this paper, an industrial case study
is presented from a utility in the UK which currently employs
all three types of automation discussed above.
III. AN INDUSTRIAL CASE STUDY
A key building block in the utility’s distribution automation
infrastructure is what is termed a Network Controllable Point
(NCP). An NCP is an item of 11kV secondary equipment
that can be controlled remotely, such as a remote terminal
unit (RTU) controlling a circuit breaker. Figure 1 illustrates a
typical underground urban network, showing the installment of
RTUs, which provide the interface that controls the switchgear.
Modern equipment can also be accessed directly with an
intelligent electronic device (IED). The utility have over 2800
NCPs installed on the network, with plans to increase to a
number approaching 5300.
NCPs have a dual purpose. One is to enable remote control
of the distribution components by the engineer manually
initiating a command in the control room via the distribution
management system (DMS). Alternatively, some NCPs form
part of the 235 automatic restoration schemes that the utility
has installed on the network. It is therefore necessary that
NCPs are in a healthy condition and ready to contribute to
both automated and remote control of switchgear.
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Fig. 1. Network diagram highlighting the placement of Fault Passage
Indicators, Central Control Units and RTUs for automatic restoration schemes
Automatic restoration can be achieved by placing fault
passage indicators (FPIs), central control units (CCUs) and
RTUs on the network to monitor and remotely control the ac-
tuators at switches and normally open points (NOP) (Figure 1).
Each RTU uses VHF digital radio equipment to communicate
with the primary CCU, which remotely controls the remote
equipment attached to that primary. When a fault occurs in a
section of the network, a circuit breaker will trip and isolate the
fault. Decision-making logic incorporated either at the control
room or the source primary can automatically restore those
disrupted customers who are not permanently affected by the
fault, through network reconfiguration and service restoration.
For example, if a fault were to occur at point A in Figure 1,
the circuit breaker at primary 1 trips, taking all customers
from primary 1 to the NOP off supply. Communication occurs
between CCU1, RTU1 and RTU2 to identify the passage of
fault current and voltage changes at these points. Since no
fault current would have been seen at RTU1, it opens the
sectionalizer. RTU2 will then close the NOP, restoring supply
to the customers between the mid point and NOP.
The DMS, along with the SCADA system’s communication
infrastructure and controllable protection equipment, forms
the architecture required to perform distribution automation
(Figure 2). The PS Alerts database stores NCP SCADA alarms
in real time that can indicate potential issues associated with
NCP equipment health.
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Fig. 2. Distribution automation with respect to the SCADA system.
The SCADA and communication infrastructure shown in
Figure 2 allows the status updates and alarms associated with
each NCP to be sent back to the control room. It is then the
task of the control engineer to examine a series of alarms to
identify any important information. Monitoring the alarms of
each NCP manually has the following disadvantages:
• An onerous amount of data is presented to the operator
from all the protection devices, as well as the RTUs.
• Moving to a smarter grid will increase the amount of
monitoring data further, with alarms being generating
from equipment that was previously unmonitored.
• Shift changes of the operators, as well as alarms spanning
a number of days, can lead to operators missing previous
alarms, which might have given an insight into the NCP
equipment’s present condition.
During knowledge elicitation with experts, five scenarios
were highlighted as problems with the NCP’s health, which
could affect its performance:
1) Every six hours, the CCU polls the RTUs to check if
they are still online. An alarm will be generated by
SCADA if the condition of that RTU changes state
(“comms fail ON” or “comms fail OFF”). There are two
general situations that engineers look for. The first is
an intermittent problem with communications, indicated
by a sequence of alarms such as comms ON, comms
OFF, comms ON, comms OFF within a 24 hour period.
The second is the more serious case of a comms ON
alarm that stays on permanently for 48 hours. Due
to a significant number of alarms being presented to
the control engineer over a number of days, it can
be difficult to keep track of the status of each RTU,
and the single alarm that corresponds to a permanent
communications failure could easily be missed.
2) A common problem associated with RTU operation is
a loss of power supply. A ground mounted RTU has an
associated power supply unit (PSU), which derives its
auxiliary power supply from the LV network. Within the
PSU there is a battery backed power supply designed to
last at least 24 hours. A loss of LV supply to the RTU
sets off a chain of events:
• First, if the LV supply is lost, through human
intervention or other errors, then a “loss of volts”
alarm is generated by SCADA.
• If the LV supply is not restored within 1–3 days,
then the battery will have discharged to the point
that it will generate a “battery alarm” by SCADA.
This is because if the sealed lead acid battery is
allowed to go below a nominal voltage it reverses
cell polarity and is damaged.
• Finally, if LV supply is still not restored, the battery
goes into deep discharge protection and shuts itself
off. This means that during the six hour health check
between CCU and RTU, the RTU will not reply and
a “comms fail ON” will be generated by SCADA.
3) When a control engineer tries to control an object a
20 second timer is started. If this time is exceeded
and the object has not changed state then a “scan task
timeout” is generated by SCADA indicating that the
object has not opened/closed within the allotted time.
However, due to different ways in which the signal
may propagate through the network, the confirmation of
successful operation may feasibly take longer than 20
seconds. It is therefore necessary to identify if objects
did in fact operate after they were commanded to do so,
and calculate how much longer than the 20 seconds they
took. This would allow the object’s timer to be set with
respect to how the comms system actually behaves, and
reduce the number of unnecessary alarms presented to
the control engineer.
4) If the state of an actuator is unknown then a “DBI
(double bit indication) alarm” is generated by SCADA.
The positional indication of remote plant is derived from
a double bit I/0 state. If this state is illegal or transitional
i.e. DBI 00 or DBI 11, then it cannot be remotely
controlled because it is unknown whether it is in an
open or closed position. This condition may have been
caused by third party intervention on site and requires
further investigation.
5) Once an automation scheme has successfully operated,
it goes into an “auto off and complete” or an “auto
off” state. Although automation has restored supply to
customers on part of the network that is unaffected by
the initial fault, the network remains in an abnormal con-
dition until it is repaired. Only once this has happened
can the automation scheme be manually re-enabled.
As the “auto off” alarms reside as historical events
there is no immediate reminder to reset the automation,
therefore, if not reactivated, the distribution automation
scheme cannot respond to any subsequent fault events
that may occur.
Although these five scenarios represent some of the expert’s
knowledge regarding the health and performance of NCPs, it
should be noted that further issues may arise over time, which
the NCP experts are presently unaware of or have not been
discussed above. The authors are developing an extensible
and flexible system to automate the interpretation of SCADA
alarms, shown in the dashed section in Figure 2. This system
is intended to provide decision support to the control engineer
regarding NCP performance and health, and aims to minimise
unnecessary loss of supply, as well as reduce CIs and CMLs
attributed to faulty NCP equipment.
IV. INTELLIGENT MONITORING
Within the power industry, there has been a wealth of
research into the use of intelligent system techniques for
alarm processing. Since each utility has different needs and
requirements based on their infrastructure for network mon-
itoring, over the years a variety of approaches have been
investigated [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [14], [8], [9], [10].
This history of research means that the strengths and weak-
nesses of each technique are well-understood. For example,
the “knowledge bottleneck”, or intensity of time and effort
required for knowledge-capture or building of models means
that rule-based and model-based systems have limited pene-
tration in the control room beyond some key installations. On
the other hand, data-driven techniques such as neural networks
require re-training whenever the network topology changes,
and cannot present engineers with an explanation of their
results, meaning that engineers are wary of the solutions they
offer.
While networks remain largely passive and centrally-
managed, alarm processing can be managed by engineers
supported by expert systems. However, with the move towards
smarter grids, with associated increases in monitoring data and
the need for systems which are more self-healing and self-
diagnosing, the case for automated alarm processing becomes
more pressing. The broader application is not new, but there
are new drivers creating a requirement for a distribution
automation alarm processor.
Model-based alarm processing is possible in situations
where a first principles understanding exists of the relationship
between function and structure of components of the system
to be diagnosed and the SCADA data, and that knowledge can
be easily be encoded as a model.
When knowledge is associational, like in the 5 cases shown
above, production rules or causal models can be an appropriate
form of knowledge representation. The up-front effort required
for knowledge elicitation is more than compensated for by the
information such a technique can provide, and production rules
map well to the way the engineer considers the problem.
A related technique is Complex Event Processing
(CEP) [15], which has been deployed successfully in industries
such as banking and finance. Microsoft see clear parallels
between these applications and those faced by the smart grid,
publishing a smart grid reference architecture (SERA) [16]
with CEP at its core. An EU Framework 7 project is currently
investigating CEP for detecting security breaches in SCADA
systems [17].
According to luckman [15], CEP consists of a mixture of
techniques, some old and some new. For example, one form of
CEP uses knowledge-based expert systems with a knowledge
modelling formalism that explicitly groups temporal data into
events. Drools Fusion is one such CEP toolkit [18], an iteration
on the popular Drools Expert expert system shell. Both Drools
Fusion and Expert employ the Rete engine for inference,
with the main difference being that the Fusion rule language
contains temporal predicates, such as ‘before’, ‘overlaps’,
‘starts’, and ‘coincides’.
The nature of the alarm processing problem is such that
temporal relationships between alarms are key for correct
interpretation of the situation. The presence or absence of
particular alarms in sequence is indicative of the type and
location of incidents in the monitored system. This means
that many rule-based expert systems developed to address
alarm processing include some method of temporal reasoning.
For example, one post-fault analysis system [7] has explicit
concepts for events and incidents: SCADA alarms are first
grouped into events, then related events are linked to form an
incident. The investigation of an incident involves analysing
the sequence of events to determine whether secondary anal-
ysis of further datasets is required.
This suggests that the power systems community may have
been performing CEP-style analysis all along, by using rule-
based expert systems for processing of temporal alarm streams.
While CEP may not represent a novel concept in the context
of alarm processing, the benefit of wider deployment of CEP
applications is that a set of tools and standard approaches to
modeling events is now available, such as Drools Fusion.
As a result, the authors have explored the use of CEP
for monitoring of the distribution automation system. The
authors believe that the benefits of knowledge-based systems,
including explainability and validation of the knowledge, can
be coupled with the CEP approaches to modelling temporal
constraints, to produce a system that meets the needs for
a distribution automation monitoring system. The following
section considers how this could be achieved.
V. USING CEP FOR MONITORING HEALTH AND
PERFORMANCE OF DISTRIBUTION AUTOMATION
In 2008, research within the authors’ research group de-
veloped a prototype system using the knowledge-based expert
system shell Drools to diagnose the health of NCP equipment.
However, one of the main challenges for this system is in
dealing with the temporal aspect of the NCP SCADA alarms,
which can span days. Utilizing a knowledge-based approach
to process the SCADA alarms means that such alarms are
required to be held in working memory for a number of
days. Additional rules were therefore required regarding the
maintenance of facts in working memory; if after a predefined
time certain facts were still in working memory, they were
deleted reducing the memory intensity. This added to the
complexity of the rule-base.
The authors have since begun exploring a CEP approach.
This type of approach removes the requirement of additional
timing rules by making each alarm an event and triggering
response actions in real time. Drools Fusion offers a CEP
framework to handle this reasoning over days/weeks, using the
architecture shown in Figure 3 to process the SCADA alarms
and diagnose the condition of the NCP equipment.
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Fig. 3. Flow of CEP.
Knowledge engineering techniques are still required to
construct domain knowledge rules if using CEP. The following
example shows the rules to handle the alarms shown in Table I,
which will be hidden in amongst tens of thousands of alarms
within that time period. These alarms are associated with a
loss of mains supply to the RTU, which triggers a series of
events explained in section III, scenario 2.
If 
And 
Then 
Alarm Name = Loss of Volts ON 
Alarm_District_Zone != test zone
This equipment has lost its LV supply and must
be visited, inform LV operational support immediately.
And Exists for > 4 hours 
Fig. 4. Rule for stage 1.
Alarm_District_Zone != test zone
This equipment has lost its LV supply and the battery is in
discharge condition. This NCP is about to lose telecontrol
and must be visited, inform LV operational support immediately.
Alarm Name = Battery Alarm ON (for the same substation name)
If 
And 
Then 
And 
Alarm Name = Loss of Volts ON 
Fig. 5. Rule for stage 2.
Alarm_District_Zone != test zone
This equipment has lost its LV supply, the battery has gone 
into deep discharge and has shutdown the NCP. Inform LV 
operational support and NCP team immediately.
Alarm Name = Comms Fail ON (for the same substation name)
If 
And 
Then 
And 
And 
Alarm Name = Battery Alarm ON (for the same substation name)
Alarm Name = Loss of Volts ON 
Fig. 6. Rule for stage 3.
Noticeable from the first rule (Figure 4), there is a waiting
time of 4 hours. This allows an engineer to visit site and put
the RTU back online. It is therefore necessary to handle this
rule over a 4 hour period, checking if the loss of volts alarm
goes OFF. If this alarm goes unnoticed and the LV supply
is not restored, then 2 days later the battery alarm ON will
be generated, meaning that the first alarm is required to be
stored in working memory for two days, prior to the second
rule (Figure 5) firing on receipt of a battery alarm ON. The
TABLE I
EXAMPLE OF ALARMS TRIGGERED FROM LOSS OF AUXILIARY SUPPLY.
STAGE EVENT TIME ALARM SUBSTATION NAME ALARM CIRCUIT NAME ALARM NAME ALARM TEXT
Stage 1 09 Dec 2010 13:17:35.360 EVERGREEN TERRACE EVERGREEN TERRACE → YELLOW BRICK ROAD LOSS OF VOLTS ON
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stage 2 11 Dec 2010 15:49:39.260 EVERGREEN TERRACE BATTERY ALARM ON
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stage 3 11 Dec 2010 22:25:19.470 EVERGREEN TERRACE COMMS FAIL ON
temporal effect of this series of alarms is seen in Table I, where
the time between the first two alarms is 2 days, 2 hours, 32
minutes and 4 seconds and the time between the second and
third alarm is 6 hours, 35 minutes and 40 seconds. Since each
later rule is dependent on the previous alarms, the alarms may
be required in the working memory over a number of days.
Figure 7 shows the CEP implementation of rule 4 explicitly
allowing the reasoning of the absence of events over a defined
time period. In this case a waiting time of 4 hours is required to
test if the “loss of volts” alarm goes OFF prior to informing
the control engineer regarding the loss of LV supply. This
constraint can be seen in the “when” part of the rule in
Figure 7.
declare Alarm
      @role(event)
end
rule "Lost LV Supply"
no-loop false
when
$lofv : Alarm(alarmName == "loss of volts", $s:subName, 
alarmText == "ON")
not (Alarm(this after[0s, 4h] $lofv, alarmName == "loss of volts",  
subName == $s, alarmText =="OFF"))
then
insert(new Event("lost LV supply, supply has not been restored after 4 
hours, engineering staff should be informed of this situation", $s));
end
Fig. 7. Example drools coding of rule 4.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Through an industrial case study, this paper has explored
some of the issues surrounding the widespread roll-out of dis-
tribution automation. The experience of a distribution network
operator in the UK illustrates the requirement for automatic
analysis of data and the role intelligent systems could play.
The five scenarios presented in this paper are only a subset of
problems domain experts currently see or anticipate seeing in
the future. As a result the authors are taking an incremental
approach to building this intelligent monitoring functionality
with the aim of extending the scope of the rule base.
The prototype system, currently being developed by the
authors, demonstrates that previous research into alarm pro-
cessing is valid in the context of dealing with the sort of data
analysis challenges the smart grid is likely to present.
While new tools for alarm processing, such as the CEP
toolkits that are both freely and commercially available, may
aid in some aspects of the development of alarm processors,
the fundamental challenges of knowledge capture and repre-
sentation in a domain where data may be uncertain or even
conflicting, still apply.
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